This section includes detailed derivations of theoretical results appearing in the main body of the paper, as well as several important extensions.
Notice that the first expectation above is
while the second is
The firm's objective is therefore
Optimizing over the initial offshoring maturity t, it is apparent that 0 = 2π N + 2π
The expression above indicates that firms follow the sector-invariant sourcing rule described by (2) , whereby production is offshored at a time-to-obsolescence that is a function of Southern intellectual property protection ξ S . This result implies a measure of varieties manufactured in the South S j (ξ S ) as in equation (3) that is weakly decreasing in T j at any ξ S :
∂T j ≤ 0. The distribution of revenues earned by Southern affiliates across sectors j is also determined by the offshoring cut-off (2),
S (1 − κ im (t)) + (1 + ξ S )r S κ im (t) ψ j (t)dt, where ψ j (t) = 1/T j is the density of product maturities and κ im (t) is the probability that a maturity-t product has been imitated. It is straightforward to see that in each industry, some measure of varieties will be imitated at any point in time: κ im (t) = t m . This implies that revenues earned by Southern affiliates in sector j are
S (1 − κ im (t)) + (1 + ξ S ) · r S κ im (t) ψ j (t)dt
For firms in longer-lifecycle sectors (with T j > τ * (ξ S )), only those with relatively mature products manufacture in the South. Of this fraction, a subset is imitated at any point in time: κ im (t) = t−[T j −τ * (ξ S )] m
. Total affiliate revenues are therefore
which, after a change of variables t = t − [T j − τ * (ξ S )] can be reduced to
We thus arrive at the distribution of affiliate revenues across sectors, equation (4) .
Response to reforms, equations (5)- (6) : When the South strengthens intellectual property rights from ξ S to ξ S , the offshoring cut-off rises: τ * (ξ S ) τ * (ξ S ). As a result, firms offshore to the South manufacturing activity associated with marginal varieties. The remaining time to obsolescence τ of a marginal variety is such that it would not yet be offshored under the old patent regime, but is under the strengthened regime: τ * (ξ S ) < τ < τ * (ξ S ). The measure of varieties manufactured in the South is thus higher under the new patent regime, which, building from (3) is described by equation (5) and plotted in the middle panel of Figure 1 .
Similarly, revenues earned by Southern affiliates will rise following the patent reform. This reflects the increased measure of varieties manufactured there from (5) as well as the strengthened patent protection provided to existing imitated varieties. These two effects combine to generate an overall increase in observed affiliate revenues as described by equation (6) . The pattern of response across sectors is an implication of the distribution of affiliate revenues described by (4) . Notice that τ * (ξ S ) < τ * (ξ S ), so that each line of (6) is the difference R j (ξ S ) − R j (ξ S ).
Multiple Southern countries, section I.F: Similar predictions to those above hold in the cross-section of countries with different levels of patent protection. To see this, consider a world that includes two Southern countries, S and S , that are symmetric but for patent institutions summarized by ξ S and ξ S > ξ S , respectively. Suppose that the combined size of S and S is 1.
Notice that if firms treat each country in isolation, Predictions 1 and 2 apply to S and S collectively. For example, suppose that imitation is costly, trade costs are infinite, and profit losses due to imitation are high relative to the benefits of offshoring. 1 It can then be shown that firms treat markets in isolation; time-to-obsolescence offshoring cut-offs τ * (ξ S ) and τ * (ξ S ) > τ * (ξ S ) obtain as above, and all main theoretical results follow.
However, these cross-section predictions also obtain in settings with lower trade costs. Indeed, more interesting cases incorporate the possibility that, with moderate (or negligible) trade costs and two Southern countries, a firm may choose to establish one foreign affiliate that serves both Southern markets. Relatedly, imitators in one Southern country may choose to sell both locally and abroad. To keep things clear, I develop this section by first considering a setting in which imitation products are not traded and trade costs are negligible. I then relax each of these assumptions and investigate the theoretical implications of these considerations.
1 -Suppose imitation products are not traded and transport costs are negligible. With two Southern countries, each firm must determine not only when to begin offshoring, but also where to locate offshore manufacturing activity. Notice that because transport costs are zero, the firm optimally consolidates manufacturing in a single, preferred location. This preferred location is the country with higher patent protection, S , for firms in all industries j. However, because we observe multinational activity in countries with both weak and strong patent protection in the data, in this multi-country extension I allow firms' location decisions to depend not only on the maximized value of lifetime profits as a function of patent rights, max t (E m [Π(t)]) in (1), but also on an unobserved component of the profit function that is independent of offshoring timing t and varies across country-firm pairs; suppose that firms realize this unobserved profit component once at the time manufacturing first begins in the South (e.g. each firm faces an idiosyncratic, country-specific shock to setup costs). This implies a positive probability of offshoring in each Southern country for every product, but only one offshoring location per product. 2 To be more precise, define
where ξ i = (1 + ξ i )/2, j(k) is the sector associated with variety k, ki is unobserved and is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across country-variety pairs following a type-1 extreme value distribution. Upon observing kS and kS , firm k determines its offshoring location by comparing π kS and π kS : the firm establishes an affiliate in country S if π kS > π kS , and otherwise offshores in country S . Denote the associated logit choice probabilities p S and p S , respectively, and notice that p S > p S because
The measure of varieties offshored in S and S respectively are therefore
Taking the difference between the two expressions above leads to the following result regarding the measure of varieties offshored in a strong-patent host-country S versus in a weak-patent hostcountry S as a function of sectors' product lifecycle lengths T j :
This difference is a non-monotonic function of T j . 2 -Consider the additional possibility that imitation goods may be traded across countries. Successfully selling an imitation product requires evading patent authorities, and a key observation in this multi-country setting is that selling imitation goods abroad requires evading such authorities both locally and in the destination country. This necessarily limits the size of the export market for imitators: for example, an imitator in S faces a probability of success selling at home (1 − ξ S ), but when selling abroad in S , enjoys only a smaller probability of success (1 − ξ S ) × (1 − ξ S ) (and has no chance of success selling in N ). Lifetime profits are therefore similar to equation (1),
, but reflect the fact that firms' offshoring decisions now depend on the quality of patent protection in S and in S . However, notice that imitation in S has a stronger effect on firm profits in S than on firm profits in S . Optimizing over the initial offshoring maturity t, it is apparent that firms offshore to S whenever a product is within τ * (ξ S , ξ S ) time to obsolescence, where
where ξ S is as defined above. An analogous cut-off τ * (ξ S , ξ S ) may be derived for offshoring to S , but because ξ S > ξ S , offshoring there begins earlier in the product lifecycle:
As a result, the logit choice probabilities are again such that p S > p S , and the general expression S j (ξ S ) − S j (ξ S ) above obtains and is a non-monotonic function of T j .
3 -Suppose now that firms face iceberg transport costs γ > 1 when shipping goods across borders, and for simplicity, return to the setting in 1) above in which imitation goods are not traded. A firm manufacturing in the North now earns flow profits π N γ 1−σ /2 in each Southern country by exporting, while a firm manufacturing in S (S ) earns flow profits π S γ 1−σ in the North and π S γ 1−σ /2 in S (S) by exporting, where π i , i = {N, S}, is as defined above. Because establishing an affiliate is costless, each firm eventually manufactures in both S and S ; however, offshoring timing is countryspecific and begins earlier in the lifecycle for countries with relatively strong patent institutions. Specifically, firms with long-lived technologies delay offshoring, exporting from the North to the South early in the product lifecycle, provided that total profits when manufacturing in the North π N (1 + γ 1−σ ) exceed total profits when manufacturing in the South when imitated, which are at most π S (γ 1−σ + [1 + ξ S ]/2) under imitation in S only. This places an upper bound on γ
where ξ S = (1 + ξ S )/2 as above. Under this condition, sector-j firms delay offshoring to S and S based on an equation similar to (1)
where t 1 and t 2 > t 1 are the product maturities at which manufacturing begins in S and S, respectively, and m captures imitation timing in S . The expression above describes lifetime profits by country, for the North (line 1), S (line 2), and S (line 3). In the North, the firm earns π N until offshoring to S begins at t 1 ; thereafter, the firm manufactures in the South, earning π S γ 1−σ in the North until the product becomes obsolete at T j . In S , the firm earns export profits from the North π N γ 1−σ until offshoring begins at t 1 ; for the product's remaining economic lifetime, the firm then earns either π S or ξ S π S depending on imitation timing m in S . In S, the firm initially earns export profits from the North π N γ 1−σ until offshoring to S begins at t 1 ; the firm then earns export profits from S , π S γ 1−σ , until offshoring to S begins at t 2 ; for the product's remaining economic lifetime, the firm then earns either π S or ξ S π S depending on imitation timing m in S. Optimizing over t 1 and t 2 yields offshoring cut-offs
. These cut-offs imply that multinational activity follows a non-monotonic pattern across S and S similar to that in cases 1) and 2) above, and analogous to that derived in the baseline two-country model.
Heterogeneous firms, section I.G:
It is simple to show that firms with relatively high productivity levels ϕ are insensitive to imitation and thus are also insensitive to the quality of offshore patent protection. Specifically, suppose that within-sector productivity differences across innovators can be summarized by a positive firm-specific parameter ϕ ∈ [ϕ L , ϕ H ] that affects profits as in Melitz (2003) . Firms with higher productivity draws earn higher profits whether manufacturing in the North π N (ϕ) = π N ϕ σ−1 or in the South π S (ϕ) = π S ϕ σ−1 , where π N , π S , and σ > 1 are as defined in section I. Assume further that imitators share a fixed productivity level below ϕ H and compete with innovators on the basis of price in any market where patents are not protected. The link between profits, prices, and marginal production costs implied by monopolistic competition indicate that imitating firms share identical marginal costs, which I denote c im ; innovating firms' marginal costs c S (ϕ) = c S /ϕ depend on multinationals' baseline marginal costs in the South c S , as well as ϕ. Notice that whenever c S (ϕ) exceeds c im , successful imitators profitably capture unprotected markets. Conversely, when c S (ϕ) < c im , or
innovators capture all markets, even those lacking patent protection. As a result, high-productivity firms with ϕ > ϕ are unaffected by imitation, and are therefore insensitive to the quality of patent protection in the South.
A.2 Data and Measurement
Measuring product lifecycle lengths, section II.A: The model described in section I indicates that product lifecycle lengths T j determine the sensitivity of firms' manufacturing location decisions to intellectual property institutions abroad. I now consider an extension of this model in which patents for new innovations cite existing patents upon entry. With this extended model, I will derive an index of T j that can be constructed using standard datasets (e.g. the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File, Hall et al 2001). Suppose as in section I that new innovations in sector j arrive at a constant Poisson rate and become obsolete after T j time; let a j denote the Poisson arrival rate in sector j. Each innovation is associated with a patent that references a set of existing patents ('prior art') relevant to the new technology. Such references impact the value of the new innovation's patent. For example, citing technologically relevant patents is valuable, because failing to include a relevant citation can cause a patent to be invalidated if challenged in court (Caballero and Jaffe 1993). However, by clarifying sensitive legal boundaries, citations limit the scope of the citing patent (Farrell and Shapiro 2008) and may thereby reduce its value. The incentive to cite an existing patent therefore depends both on a) the prior patent's technological proximity to the new innovation, and b) the prior technology's underlying value (which determines the likelihood of litigation, see Allison et al 2004), which I take to be a function of its own remaining lifetime as in section I. Accordingly, I assume that for innovation k, citing a prior sector-j patent i generates the following net value
where t > 0 is the arrival time of innovation k, T j is the obsolescence date of innovation i introduced at t = 0, v > 0 is the per-period citation value received by k while technology i is still viable, and c ik is the net fixed cost of a citation by patent k to patent i. The first term in (1) corresponds to item b) above, the prior technology i's value, which depends both on a common per-period value v and i's remaining lifetime T j − t. The second term c ik corresponds to a) and captures technological proximity between k and i: for example, c ik ≡ c − b ik , where c is a common fixed citation cost and b ik is an idiosyncratic fixed benefit to k for citing i that is high when technology k is closely-related to i and is low otherwise. I assume that innovation k draws c ik from a distribution f (cdf F ) with support [c, c] (where c > 0 but c may be positive or negative) for each sector-j patent i that exists at t. Upon arrival, patent k cites patent i if and only if V j ik (t) > 0. As above, consider a sector-j technology i with obsolescence date T j . It follows that for any subsequent innovation k arriving at date t < T j , F (v(T j − t)) is the probability that k cites technology i's patent; that is, F (v(T j − t)) = P {c ik < v(T j − t)} = P {V j ik (t) > 0} is the probability that technology k draws a net fixed cost c ik such that V j ik (t) > 0. Therefore, patent i receives citations at the time-varying rate
as a function of its age t. The expression above implies that the citation rate is initially high; then, either immediately or at some later point begins to gradually decline over time, before eventually reaching a low plateau at T j ; this plateau is positive if c < 0 and hence F (0) > 0, while it is zero if c = 0. To be exact, the slope of the arrival rate function λ j (t) changes over time as follows
where t 1 = max{0, T j − c/v}. Suppose that the citation history is observable for any patent, within up to T time after its introduction, but that the parameters T j , ν, and a j are unknown. Based on the observed citation information, it is possible to recover cross-sector variation in T j . In particular, by specifying a distribution f , explicit moments of the citation process described by λ j (t) above may be derived. For example, assume that c ki follows a uniform distribution on [− , 1− ], with νT j ≤ 1− . Citations to any sector-j patent i then arrive at rate
According to this process, each sector-j patent i = 1, 2, ..., N j receives some random number of citations X ji (t) within t time after it is published. Consider the aggregated citation process X j (t) = N j i=1 X ji (t) across all N j sector-j patents. It can be shown that the expected mean citation time
where t 1 , t 2 , ..., t X j (T ) are the respective citation times (or citation lags), and
is the average fraction of citations during [0, T ] that occur before T j . Provided that the rate of postobsolescence citations is not too large relative to the rate of pre-obsolescence citations v, m j (T ) monotonically increases in T j , allowing me to use this as an index of T j in my empirical analysis. Intuitively, monotonicity obtains because a higher T j raises the average pre-obsolescence citation time, but also reduces the average fraction of post-obsolescence citations, which tend to have long lags. The first effect dominates provided that the post-obsolescence citation rate is small relative to v; this seems reasonable given that empirical distributions of class-level patent citation timing show that the citation rate generally declines with patent age. Notice that alternative statistics such as the average maximum citation time or the average sum of citation times are not robust to > 0 or variation in a j across sectors. I construct m j (T ) for each technology class j using patent citation data, as described below. My main empirical results are based on this index of T j : T j = m j (T ).
Lemma 1: The expected mean patent citation age m j (T ) within [0, T ] time is monotonically increasing in the economic lifetime T j of innovations in sector j.
Proof of Lemma 1:
which is increasing in T j .
Constructing T j : I construct the index proposed above, T j , using information in the NBER Patent Citations Data File (Hall, et al 2001) . Each U.S. patent granted between 1976 and 1990 is matched with any patent citing it during 1976-2006. The citation time ("forward citation lag") t is the difference, in years, between the application date of the citing patent and the grant date of the cited patent. For each technology class j, I compute the average citation time (T ) across sector-j patents. I also compute the 75 th -percentile and 85 th -percentile citation times for each patent class j. I verify that each of these measures is stable across samples restricted to include only patents with a minimum number of citations (20, 50); this helps to ensure that they are not influenced by variation across sectors in the prevalence of "unimportant" patents. Because the truncation limit T depends on the cited patent's grant date, I also verify the stability of the measure under a uniform truncation rule, whereby citation lags are limited to 16 years across all patents. As a final step, I translate these product lifecycle length indexes into SIC(3)-level measures using a USPTO concordance (downloaded from ftp://ftp.uspto.gov/pub/taf/sicconc/2005diskette/). SIC(3)-level measures are equal-weighted indexes of the patent class-level measures; the alternative approach of using input-output weights is not appropriate because is unclear how the value-composition of production inputs is related to the value-composition of patented intellectual property within a sector. Stata code is available upon request.
Constructing alternative measures of T j : I construct alternative class-level proxies based on U.S. patent renewal data. U.S. utility patents issued on or after December 12, 1980 are subject to maintenance fees, which must be paid to keep the patent in force. Maintenance fees are due 3 patents/process/maintain.jsp). Using USPTO maintenance fee data (available through Google; see www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-maintenance-fees.html), which records the dates of all maintenance fee events by patent, I compute each patent's implied duration, and thereby construct a distribution of patent durations by patent class. I then compute moments of this distribution including the mean, 75 th percentile, and 85 th percentile durations. I find that the average renewal-based proxy is minimally correlated with T j , while higher levels of correlation (approximately 30%) obtain for the for the 75 th -and 85 th -percentile proxies. Robustness checks using this renewal-based alternative also reveal that firms in high-T sectors are significantly more sensitive to patent protection than firms in low-T sectors. Note, however, that there are important differences between my preferred measure and renewal-based measures. As described in Schankerman and Pakes (1986) , the renewal decision is based on the private value of continued patent protection to the patentee. By contrast, patent citations underlying T j represent valuable technological links between the patented innovation and subsequently patented innovations. Whenever the private value of a patented innovation differs from the innovation's value to subsequent innovators-for example due to technology spillovers (Keller and Yeaple 2009, Bloom et al 2013) and imperfect appropriability of knowledge-renewal-based and citation-based indexes of technology durability will tend to diverge. Importantly, because the extent to which firms are able to appropriate the returns to patented innovations differs across industries (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000), this divergence can affect both the level and the rank-ordering of implied technology durability across industries when durability is inferred from renewals versus from citations. This alternative proxy, much like the turnover rates in Broda and Weinstein (2010), may therefore capture variation beyond that which T is meant to reflect in the model. Figure A.1, below right) , I find an average change in measured T j of 0.0081 years (standard deviation 0.0581). These comparisons indicate certain degree of stability in the product lifecycle length index. Within-sector deviations in measured T j across comparable samples tend to be small, and most differences are within a range of +/-0.10 years. Differences are larger for a small number (four) of industries, falling in the range of +/-0.10 to 0.30 years; this amounts to between a 1% and 5% difference in measured T j in the shortest-lifecycle industry, and between 0.5% and 3% in the longest-lifecycle industry. Taken together, these comparisons indicate stability in the product lifecycle length measure. Data are available upon request.
Patent rights index:
The index of patent protection is published in Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) . The index is available for 122 countries between 1960 and 2005, at five-year inter- vals, and is the sum of five sub-indexes corresponding to 1) enforcement, 2) coverage, 3) provisions for the loss of protection, 4) duration, and 5) membership in international intellectual property treaties. Further details are described at length in the two aforementioned publications. Based on additional empirical analysis (section V), it is apparent that the most important components of the index for my results are enforcement and membership in international treaties. I thank Walter Park for generously providing me with the complete panel of sub-indexes.
Multinational activity and data sample: Confidential data on the activity abroad of U.S. multinational firms is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis through a sworn-status research arrangement. The data include detailed financial and operating information for each foreign affiliate owned (at least a 10% share) by a U.S. entity. The data variables used for this project were extracted from the BEA's comprehensive data files for each benchmark year, and then merged by parent and affiliate identification numbers to form a complete panel. Observations were excluded if a) values were carried over or imputed based on previous survey responses; b) the firm in question was in a sector that did not correspond to any U.S. patent class according to the USPTO concordance described above; or c) the observation was a new entrant in the final year (2004) with a NAICS classification that could not be definitively matched to a SIC code in the industry sample.
Of the approximately 55 sectors in the overall benchmark dataset, 37 primarily manufacturing sectors are included in my dataset; this corresponds to approximately 1000 U.S.-based parent companies per year, each with an average of ten foreign affiliate operations.
My empirical analysis relies on affiliate-level sales revenues, assets, and employment reported in benchmark-year surveys in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 . Dependent variables at the countryindustry-year level are constructed by aggregating across relevant affiliate operations and then transforming the aggregate quantity as needed. The number of affiliates in Table 4 is determined by counting the number of unique industry-j affiliates operating in country i during period t, and the dependent variable is the log of this quantity. Affiliate sales (assets, employment) in Table  5 is determined by summing the revenues (assets, employment) of industry-j affiliates located in country i during period t. The dependent variable in Table 5 is the log of this quantity. The binary affiliate presence variable in Table 3 is constructed by first taking the set of countries in which multinational activity is observed in at least one sample industry-year pair; for this set of countries, the affiliate presence variable is assigned a zero for any industry-year pair in which there is no multinational activity, and is assigned a one otherwise. Table 8 is based on the same sample of countries, but instead of zeros and ones, includes the ratio of affiliate sales at the country-industryyear level divided by affiliate sales plus U.S. exports at the country-industry-year level. Notice that Tables 3 and 8 necessarily contain more observations than Tables 4-6 . Table 7 considers affiliate-level sales and therefore includes more observations than other tables. Table 7 results also rely on a categorization of affiliates as subsidiaries of Low Productivity and High Productivity firms. This categorization is based on a simple firm-level Solow residual criterion: Low Productivity firms are those with a global mean Solow residual falling in the lower half of the distribution across firms, while all others are High Productivity firms. The global Solow residual for each firm-year is determined by regressing firm-level log value added on firm-level log physical assets, firm-level log employment, industry, and year dummies; firm-year residuals resulting from this regression are averaged over time periods by firm to determine a time-invariant, firm-specific global mean Solow residual. This latter time-invariant measure is used to determine each firm's productivity category (Low Productivity or High Productivity). Firm-level value added for firm k is U.S. parent value added plus the sum of affiliate-level value added across all firm-k foreign affiliates. Firm-level physical assets (the value of plant, property and equipment, net of depreciation) and firm-level employment (number of employees) are constructed similarly. The value of plant, property, and equipment net of depreciation is not available in 1982; this year is therefore excluded from my productivity calculation.
My empirical analysis also relies on two additional variables with only limited coverage, the index of patent protection IP R it and GDP pc it . Missing observations impact sample sizes across all tables. Although I also include simple specifications for each table that include minimal controls, I restrict samples across columns so that results within each table are directly comparable. All regression code is available upon request.
(1) (10) . The dependent variable indicates an increase in sales by affiliates of U.S.-based multinational firms by country, sector, and year and is based on firm-level data from the BEA. IPR is the index of patent protection from Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) . T is the product lifecycle length, by industry, and is the average patent citation lag based on data from the USPTO and NBER. R&D Intensity is the average ratio of R&D to sales by industry based on BEA data, and GDP per capita (GDPpc) is from the Penn World (7) for sectors with Low and High Patent Effectiveness as well as variants that allow differential effects of IPR based on Patent Effectiveness. The dependent variable is the log of affiliate sales (columns 1-3) or the log number of affiliates (columns 4-6), for U.S.-based multinational firms by country, sector, and year, and based on firm-level data from the BEA. IPR is the index of patent protection from Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) . T is the product lifecycle length, by industry, and is the average patent citation lag based on data from the USPTO and NBER. R&D Intensity is the average ratio of R&D to sales by industry based on BEA data, and GDP per capita (GDPpc) is from the Penn World Table, 
